M6:2470 — گرگ دریابد ولی را به بود / زانک دریابد ولی را نفس بد

Translation: Should a wolf find a saint, it would be better; for a wicked soul also finds the saint (and its harm is deeper). Meaning: This verse suggests that the malevolence and depravity of ill-intentioned, self-serving humans inflict a harm far greater and more profound than any physical attack by a predatory animal, especially upon a spiritual saint.

This verse is nestled within a larger narrative where Mawlana recounts the ignoble treatment of elders by the common people (laʾām). The preceding tale of a ram, an ox, and a camel bargaining over a bundle of fodder evolves into a critique of disrespect towards spiritual luminaries in Mawlana's time. Our Master, Dr. Soroush, beautifully explains that even if the masses outwardly offer service to a Sheikh or a saint, there is almost certainly a "corrupt motive" (qarinah-yi fasid) underlying their actions. It is here that Mawlana utters a profoundly unsettling statement, which is key to understanding the nature of evil and human malice.

I understand this verse to mean: Mawlana suggests that if a saint were to fall into the clutches of a wolf and be torn apart, it would be preferable to being apprehended by the evil self (nafs-i bad) of another human. Why? Because the harm inflicted by a human with a wolf-like disposition is a hundred times worse and more profound than any injury a real wolf might cause. Mawlana's core argument appears in the subsequent line: "For though a wolf be most oppressive, it lacks that 'culture,' that cunning and deceit." Here, Mawlana draws a crucial distinction between animal evil and human evil.

A wolf, though a predator and ruthless, lacks farhang (culture) – and by farhang, Mawlana here means cunning, trickery, and guile, not its contemporary meaning. Animals act directly and without pretense; they employ their physical strength and are driven by clear instincts. They know no deceit or trickery. But humans, even if physically weaker, are equipped with a different kind of power: "cunning" (makr) and "guile" (ḥilah). This "culture, cunning, and deceit" is precisely what Mawlana identifies as a uniquely human trait, one from which animals are devoid.

However, a subtle point in Mawlana's phrasing must be noted. Mawlana states, "though a wolf be most oppressive" (bas istamgarīst). We typically do not consider animals to be "oppressive" or "tyrannical" (ẓālim), because oppression and justice are moral concepts that only acquire meaning within the framework of "justice" and "intent." Animals lack this moral framework; they act based on instinct, and we do not punish or blame them. In the words of analytic philosophers like Gilbert Ryle, oppression and justice are "second-order acts" that are superimposed upon natural (first-order) actions. For example, eating is a first-order act; but "eating usuriously" or "eating oppressively" is a second-order act, requiring a moral consciousness and intent that animals do not possess. Thus, perhaps Mawlana would have been better served by using a word like "predatory" instead of "oppressive." Yet, this linguistic imprecision does not detract from the profoundness of his message.

The core takeaway is this: human harm is deeper precisely because it involves cunning, trickery, and deception. Even when we speak of a "cunning fox," we are, in fact, projecting human attributes onto animals through "analogy to self" (qiyās bi-nafs). Mawlana emphasizes that our understanding of animals often stems from this self-analogy. Humans do not even have full access to the inner lives of other humans, let alone animals. It is this human complexity, and our capacity for deceit and cunning, that renders our evil a hundredfold more lethal than the natural malice of an animal; this is the lesson we must draw from this verse.

Key takeaways

• The malice of a wicked human is deeper than animal aggression.
• A wolf acts without guile; a human acts with cunning and deception.
• In Mawlana's lexicon, farhang (culture) can signify trickery and stratagem.
• Moral concepts like oppression and justice are uniquely human, tied to 'second-order' actions.
• Attributing human traits to animals (e.g., 'cunning fox') is an anthropomorphic projection.
• Harm resulting from deceit and treachery is more destructive than purely physical injury.