M6:1620 — چونک دو مثل آمدند ای متقی / این چه اولیتر از آن در خالقی

Translation: Since two things are alike, O pious one, How can one be more primary than the other in creating? Meaning: This verse posits that if two entities are entirely similar, neither can logically precede the other as a primary creator, for true origination requires a causal superiority over the created.

This verse presents a pivotal point in Rumi’s theology and ontology, intricately linked to the concept of God being free of any 'opposite' (ḍidd) or 'peer' (nadd). I have often stressed that Rumi perceives God, in essence and action, as devoid of both. Ḍidd clearly means an antagonist or counter-force that negates or destroys another. Nadd, however, signifies a 'like' or 'peer' – something utterly identical to another.

Here, Rumi queries: “Since two things are alike, O pious one, how can one be more primary than the other in creating?” That is, O pious human, if two things are entirely similar, how can one possess primacy in the attribute of creativity or origination over the other? Can one 'like' create another 'like'? Unequivocally, no. This statement is directed at the notion of the 'perfect cause' (ʿillat-i tāmmah). In the vertical hierarchy of cause and effect, the perfect cause must always be 'higher than the effect' (aʿlā az maʿlūl), more powerful, and not merely a 'like'. A 'like' cannot create its own 'like', much less can an 'opposite' create another 'opposite'.

Of course, one must distinguish between this 'perfect cause' (which is God) and the 'imperfect causes' (ʿilal-i nāqiṣah) or 'preparatory causes' (ʿilal-i muʿiddah) in the natural world. In the natural world, indeed, 'a like creates a like' and even 'an opposite creates an opposite'. Consider a factory producing dozens of identical products, or a mother giving birth to a child resembling herself; or even the restlessness of the lover arising from the steadfastness of the beloved. These are all instances of imperfect causes where similars, or even opposites, bring each other into being. However, in the realm of the absolute and unmediated creativity of the Truth, these rules have no place. God is peerless and unequaled, and therefore, the term 'like' cannot be applied to Him, rendering the query “since two things are alike...” inconceivable in His regard.

It is for this reason that Rumi subsequently likens the 'opposites' and 'peers' of this world to 'foam upon a sea without peer or opposite'. That is, all these differences and similarities we observe in the natural world are like ephemeral foam resting upon the simple, unqualified, and ineffable ocean of divine existence. God is an existence beyond all attributes and comparisons, and He cannot be analogized with the creatures of the world. Even our soul (jān), which is 'His least plaything', is free from physical qualities and cannot be assigned a location, color, or taste. How then can we conceive of a Creator who brought forth such a placeless soul as a 'like' or 'peer'? This placelessness and qualitative emptiness of the soul itself stands as a testament to the ineffability and qualitative transcendence of its Creator.

Key takeaways

• God, in His essence and action, is without ḍidd (opposite) or nadd (peer/like).
• A true and perfect Creator cannot be entirely similar to His creation; the cause must transcend the effect.
• Rumi distinguishes between the 'perfect cause' (God) and 'imperfect causes' (natural phenomena); the rule 'a like cannot create a like' applies only to the perfect cause.
• The existence of opposites and peers in the natural world is like 'foam' upon the 'sea without how-ness' of absolute reality; these are accidental qualities upon God's simple existence.
• Even the human soul, a creation of God, is free from physical 'how-ness' (chigūnagī); this testifies to the ineffable and unquantifiable nature of its Creator.