M6:1513 — چون برای حق و روز آجله‌ست / گر خطایی شد دیت بر عاقله‌ست

Translation: Since [the judge's decision is] for Truth and the Day of Reckoning, Should an error occur, the blood-money falls upon his 'āqilah (paternal kin). Meaning: This verse asserts that a judge's rulings are for divine truth and the Last Day; therefore, if an error inadvertently occurs in carrying out a judgment, the financial compensation (diyah) falls not on the judge personally, but on his paternal relatives or clan.

This verse emerges from the preceding description of a just judge: one who imposes discipline and punishment “for the sake of the oppressed” and “not for money, anger, income, or expenses.” This means the judge's work must be free of personal whims, anger, or worldly gain; they must solely pursue justice for Truth (Haqq) and for the Day of Reckoning. Mawlana beautifully accompanies this concept with metaphors like a mirror and a scale: just as a mirror shows an image without ego, and a scale weighs without personal bias, a judge must be impartial and egoless. This is why he states: “Since [his decision is] for Truth and the Day of Reckoning.” The act of judgment, due to its immense gravity and connection to ultimate truth, transcends the judge's individual error, and its responsibility must be managed differently.

From this point, Mawlana alludes to a subtle jurisprudential point: “Should an error occur, the blood-money falls upon his 'āqilah.” This is a fiqhī term with roots in the Arabian tribal era, later integrated into Islamic jurisprudence. 'Aqilah refers to the paternal relatives or clan of an individual who bear the responsibility for diyah (blood-money) if the individual commits an unintentional killing or injury. The judge, by virtue of his critical and sacred position, is not personally liable if an error inadvertently occurs during the execution of a ḥadd (prescribed punishment) or taʿzīr (discretionary punishment) (e.g., if someone dies as a result of the ruling). Instead, the diyah falls upon his 'āqilah. This ruling illustrates how fiqh developed and was structured within a specific cultural and social context.

What must be emphasized is Mawlana's unparalleled ability to extract fiqhī and legal concepts from their original contexts and elevate them to higher, mystical dimensions. He uses this term again in the third book of the Masnavi, interpreting it differently: “If I erred, the diyah is upon the 'āqilah. You were the 'āqilah of my soul from eternity.” Here, the 'āqilah is not merely paternal kin, but the “You” that has supported the mystic's soul from eternity, implying that any error on this path somehow relates back to that transcendent origin. This approach by Mawlana is a profound lesson in how one can transcend the language and terminology of an era and employ them in service of eternal meanings.

However, in our contemporary era, attempts to justify this fiqhī ruling with modern concepts like “insurance,” which did not exist then, are baseless and “undoubtedly” incorrect. Insurance is a contractual agreement of a different nature, whereas diyah on the 'āqilah was a ruling founded on tribal relations and mutual support among paternal relatives. One cannot illogically apply a rule that was perfectly “reasonable” in a tribal world to today's world, presenting it as justified through such rationalizations. These types of justifications are themselves a sign of an insistence on preserving form without regard for the essence and social function, which must be subjected to serious critique.

Key takeaways

• Judgment is a sacred act performed for Truth and the Day of Reckoning, requiring the judge to be devoid of personal biases.
• The concept of 'diyah on the 'āqilah' is a jurisprudential ruling rooted in tribal social structures, placing responsibility for unintentional error on paternal kin.
• Mawlana elevates legal terminology to the mystical realm, interpreting 'āqilah' as the eternal Beloved, the origin of the soul.
• Critique of modern justifications: Obsolete legal concepts cannot be anachronistically justified by invoking contemporary institutions (like insurance).
• Every social ruling must be understood within its historical context; what was reasonable in a tribal era does not necessarily function in the modern age.