M6:424 — چونک حاکم این کند اندر گزین / چون کند حکم احکم این حاکمین

Translation: Since the ruler (human judge) makes such a choice in meting out justice, / How then would be the judgment of the Wisest of Judges (God)? Meaning: This verse implies that if human judgments are divinely inspired in their choice of punishment, then God's ultimate decree, as the wisest of all judges, must be perfectly and inherently just.

This verse emerges from a profound and pivotal discussion in the sixth book of the Masnavi, where Mowlana emphatically weighs in on human free will (ikhtiyār), standing firmly against determinism (jabr). Here, Mowlana introduces a unique concept, which I call the 'unseen form of actions and the inherent retribution of deeds.' His view is that the punishments stipulated in human legal systems for crimes – such as those for armed robbery, mentioned even in the Quran – are not merely social or human constructs, but rather divine inspirations. As Mowlana himself states: 'How does hanging resemble stealing? Yet that / Is the image from the God, the Knower of the Unseen.' This means that while hanging a thief might not outwardly resemble the act of stealing itself, this 'image' or decree is instilled by God, the Knower of the Unseen (ghayb-dān), into the hearts of judges and authorities.

Our discussed verse now culminates this argument with a rhetorical question, drawing a powerful conclusion: If an earthly ruler, divinely inspired, makes such choices in meting out punishment, then 'How then would be the decree of the Wisest of Judges?' This question reveals the majesty, justice, and truth of divine judgment. Mowlana suggests that this connection between action and retribution is not merely contractual; it is not as if humans arbitrarily decide upon a specific penalty for a particular act. Rather, there is a real and deep connection between the deed and its consequence, which God has given 'form' in the unseen (ghayb). This 'form' then becomes accessible to human understanding through inspiration. In other words, the act itself seems to bring forth its own effect. This point has always struck me as both difficult and deeply insightful; yet, accepting the idea that an action is 'formed' in the unseen, with its inherent retribution emerging from it, though somewhat unfamiliar to the modern mind, illustrates for Mowlana the profound link between action and its outcome.

This idea carries significant implications for the discussion of free will. If the recompense for actions has an inherent, real root and is not merely conventional, then human accountability and the acceptance of one's free will gain a much stronger meaning. One can no longer claim, 'You broke the goblet and now you strike us' (implying divine determinism); instead, one must take responsibility for one's own faults and not attribute them to fate or destiny. As Mowlana states in other verses in this chapter: 'Suffering is caused by evil-doing; / Recognize evil from your own act, not from fate.' This verse, indirectly, solidifies the philosophical foundations for the necessity of repentance (tawba) and the acceptance of moral responsibility; for repentance can only originate from one who deems oneself free and recognizes sin as born of one's own action, not of preordained destiny.

Key takeaways

• Retribution for actions is not merely contractual but possesses a real, divine origin.
• Our deeds have an unseen form in the spiritual realm that inherently dictates their consequences.
• Even human judgments and punishments, in their specific details, are divinely inspired.
• If earthly judges receive such inspiration, then the decree of God, the Wisest of Judges, is infinitely more just and sagacious.
• This concept reinforces human accountability and emphasizes free will, offering a philosophical justification for repentance.