M6:414 — خون کند زید و قصاص او به عمر / می خورد عمرو و بر احمد حد خمر

Translation: If Zayd spills blood and his retribution falls upon Omar, Or Amr drinks wine and its punishment is inflicted upon Ahmad.

Meaning: Through this incisive rhetorical question, Rumi vividly illustrates the absurdity and injustice of denying personal agency and misattributing actions or their consequences to others; every action has an agent, and every agent has a rightful recompense.

This verse, delivered with a decisive and resonant interrogative tone, stands at the heart of a fundamental and ancient debate in human thought: the question of free will and responsibility. At this juncture of the Mathnawi, particularly in Book Six—the culmination of Rumi’s later years and mature reflection—he emphatically underscores human free will (ikhtiyār). His words here are a direct response to determinists, to those who seek to cast the burden of their faults and imperfections upon fate (qazā) or others.

I believe this verse constitutes a powerful rational and conscientious argument. Does sound reason accept that Zayd commits a crime, while Omar, innocent, suffers its retribution? Is it just for Amr to indulge in wine, and for Ahmad, who has done nothing, to bear its prescribed punishment (ḥadd)? Undoubtedly, the answer is no. Such a scenario is fundamentally contrary to justice, reason, and conscience. Through this, Rumi reminds us of the indissoluble link between action and agent. As he states: "Blame not fate, O youth / Why cast your own crime upon others?" We must not use the excuse of destiny as a shield for our own misdeeds.

In this view, God, the "Most Just of Judges (Aḥkam al-Ḥākimīn)", would never render such an unfair judgment. "The discerning Lord knows the adversary (khaṣm)". He knows well who committed the act. This is not merely a legalistic justice; Rumi speaks of the inherent consequences of actions (jazā-yi dhātī-yi a'māl). Human actions are like children born of one's soul and body, clinging to one's skirt: "Your action, born of your soul and body / Like your child, will grasp your skirt." The good or ill of every action is intrinsically tied to its agent, and its outcome is not transferred to another. If you eat too much honey, it is you who fall ill, not someone else. If you fast, the reward is yours, not another's. This is the law of existence; what you sow, you shall reap: "When you sow barley, does anything but barley grow?"

A crucial point Rumi makes here is that the denial of free will is, in essence, the denial of the self (nafy-i khwishtan). When a person claims, "I was compelled," they are, in fact, saying, "I was nothing," "I did not exist," "I had no agency." It is as if external factors merely passed through them, and they were a passive, lifeless conduit. But this is a clear fallacy. As Iqbal Lahori—with whom I agree—argues, if we are created in God's image, the first endowment we receive from Him is precisely this free will. God is free, and we too, since "He created us in His own image," are free. Our hesitation and doubt between performing or not performing an act is the best sign of our agency: "We remain in indecision between two tasks / When would this indecision exist without free will?" One does not hesitate over matters over which one has no power. This shows that we always have a share in our own actions; even if a hundred other factors are at play, we are the hundred and first factor. To deny this share is to deny one's very existence.

Therefore, Rumi emphasizes that the sufferings and hardships that befall us are not due to "luck (bakht)", "fortune (ṭāliʿ)", or "destiny (sarnevesht)"; rather, they are the result of our own misdeeds and choices: "Know that suffering has ill-doing as its cause / And evil comes from your own act, not from fate." Those who constantly look to luck become "squint-eyed (aḥwal)" and grow lazy and indolent: "Such a gaze at luck makes the eye squint-eyed / And makes a dog stay in its straw-shed, lazy." They do not accuse themselves, and for this reason, they never repent of their actions. But repentance (tawbah), regret, and the resolve to abandon evil deeds in the future, is itself the greatest sign of belief in one's free will and responsibility. This verse is, truly, a call to honest self-confrontation and the full acceptance of responsibility for who we are and what we do.

Key takeaways

• Divine justice and a sound conscience unequivocally reject the linking of one agent's action to another's retribution.
• Human actions, like children born of the agent, inherently bind their good or ill consequences to the doer.
• Denying free will and attributing actions to fate or others is, in essence, a denial of one's own identity and existence.
• The very act of hesitation and indecision in choices serves as a decisive indicator of human free will.
• Our sufferings and misfortunes stem not from luck or destiny, but are the direct result of our own misdeeds and choices.